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Abstract— This paper proposes alternatives for governments to 
deal with the current pandemic crisis today. It suggests ways to 
deal with the increasing debt levels as a result of the fiscal 
stimulus issued to cushion the effects of a tremendous shock to 
the economy. 
Firstly, the paper proposes to protect the vulnerable group 
(based on debt-to-income ratio or its debt-servicing ability) 
through debt forgiveness and help SMEs through debt relief via 
debt restructuring for their outstanding loans. To finance this, we 
propose to convert the increased public debt from these 
initiatives into equity through a GDP-linked sukuk to stabilise a 
sovereign’s debt to GDP ratio. The repayment on these sukuk 
will be in proportion to the country’s GDP whereby the 
repayment automatically declines when growth is weak and 
increases when GDP is strong. In doing so, an anticipated deep 
recession caused by the global pandemic slowdown will makes it 
less likely to trigger a sovereign debt crisis.  
Secondly, such a strategy would provide the issuing government 
with economic reprieve when growth weakens and tax receipts 
decline. At the same time, investors can view these sukuk as an 
alternative asset class through exposure to the real economy, 
given the low interest rate environment. Both sides are 
incentivized by the debt-stabilising effects of issuance that would 
make sovereign defaults less likely and balance risk-taking. 
Keywords - debt limits, fiscal space, growth-linked sukuk, 
sovereign debt management. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Combating the COVID-19 pandemic has elicited radical 
responses from governments and world health officials, which 
has resulted in some of the most drastic strategies that we have 
seen in our recent history. The consequential lock-down of the 
suspected originating city in China, have quickly expanded 
extreme measures to the quarantine of entire provinces and 
entire countries, slowing down economic activities 
substantially. 
To ensure that all countries can do what is necessary to 
fight the economic fallout of the pandemic, the fiscal costs of 
this global crisis for each nation has been great. Many 
governments have already pledged billions in grants to support 
health care, liquidity to the private sector (credit lines to 
SMEs), short-time work schemes and stimulus packages. In 
order to do so, governments have to dig deep into their reserves 
and for others, resort to debt. The need for stable capital flows 
to help moderate the path to economic recovery requires 
support for the real economy and dealing with potential 
sovereign defaults, if capital runs out before the economy 
recovers adequately. It is therefore important to develop and 
utilize market instruments that can boost the recovery curve. 
This paper investigates the stimulus alternatives that are being 
implemented at the moment and suggests ways to deal with the 
increasing debt levels as a result of the fiscal stimulus issued to 
cushion the effects of a tremendous shock to the economy. It 
proposes the conversion of public debt into equity through 
GDP-linked sukuk to ―stabilise a sovereign‘s debt to GDP ratio 
and makes it less likely that a deep recession will trigger a debt 
crisis and cause a default‖ [3] based on the findings of various 
research on GDP-linked bonds. 
A. Objectives of Research 
In this pandemic, our current lack of knowledge about the 
virus is our greatest weakness in combating it. Not knowing 
who has been infected, or who is a carrier without symptoms, 
contributes to higher infection rates. Not knowing enough 
about the virus delays our ability to treat those infected, or 
release those from quarantine with absolute confidence. It 
hinders our judgement to restart the economy and leaves us 
little choice but to take a measured approach in getting people 
back to work and to allow businesses to return to operations. 
Containment measures to ―flatten the curve‖ are still enforced 
and loosened in phases in order to prevent a second wave, 
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which historically had been more deadly than the first
1
. 
Adjustments to work-from-home (WFH) orders and social-
distancing has transformed business-as-usual to such an extent 
that shifts in the economy will be inevitable. Also, within the 
next few months, there will be companies, both big and small, 
that will file for bankruptcy and there will be sovereign 
defaults as countries face drying liquidity.  
In order to prevent undesired outcomes, we propose that 
governments can do two things, on top of what have already 
been implemented. (1) Identify the ‗most vulnerable group‘ 
within their communities and assess their household and 
personal debt levels for consideration of debt forgiveness. (2) 
Allow micro, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to 
restructure their corporate debts or renegotiate for new terms as 
a form of debt relief. These two initiatives will be funded 
through a GDP-linked sukuk issued by the country. The 
financial burdens lifted by these initiatives will have positive 
effects on the economy as capital which would have been used 
to pay down the debts will instead be utilized as spending or 
consumption for the vulnerable groups and necessary 
expenditure for the SMEs. This cycle of spending will in turn 
contribute towards GDP growth and, directly and indirectly, 
save jobs and limit unemployment. 
II. REVIEW ON GDP-LINKED BONDS AND SUKUK 
A. Creating Sustainable Sovereign Instruments 
In order to finance the proposed debt forgiveness for 
households and debt relief for SMEs, governments can issue 
public debt instruments such as sovereign sukuk [13; 7]. 
However, doing so creates more fiscal indebtedness. GDP-
linked sukuk is one way to convert those debts into equity 
repayments based on GDP performance of the country. Such 
growth-linked financial instruments are a type of security akin 
to a ―stock on a country‖ in the sense that it has ―equity-like‖ 
features. Similarly, it pays more ‗dividends‘ when the 










                                                          
1 There were three waves in the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918: the first 
occurred in the Spring, the second in the Autumn/Fall and the third in Winter. 




Figure 1: Simplified Structure of GDP-linked Sukuk 














Taking into consideration experiences from other financial 
instruments, especially the Argentina's successes with 
inflation-linked sukuk as well as their failings with "GDP 
warrants", we recommend a GDP-linked sukuk that will 
incorporate the following principles in its design: (i) simplicity 
— keeping conditional payment triggers simple to avoid 
failures of trading out of the money for long periods as well as 
hindering fair-value pricing; (ii) recognizability — maintaining 
the industry-standard terms present in inflation-linked sukuk 
contracts and adapting them where necessary; (iii) pliability — 
with a flexible term sheet template designed to accommodate 
the range of emerging and advanced economies with slight 
adjustments; (iv) balanced risk-sharing — with the investor 
sharing the rewards of the upside as well as the risks of the 
downside, which reinforces the debt-stabilising physiognomies 
of this structure for the issuer as well as incentives for return 
and repayment. 
B. Debt Limit and Fiscal Space 
We discuss the work done on GDP-linked bonds by IMF 
researchers [10; 22] where they show ―how the structure of 
sovereign debt can alter the payment capacity of a government, 
which delivers a calculation of the maximum level of debt that 
a sovereign is likely to be able to sustain before it risks facing a 
crisis‖. The concept of the debt limit captures the 
understanding of fiscal fatigue where ―an improvement in a 
country‘s structural characteristics or economic growth rate 
raises its debt limit, while the occurrence (or recognition of the 
possibility) of a negative shock could push an otherwise 
sustainable debt level to the unsustainable territory‖. They 
found evidence of fiscal reactions where ―governments face 
debt limits beyond which debt cannot be rolled-over‖. They 
used these findings to compute ―fiscal space‖ which is ―defined 
as the difference between projected debt ratios and debt limits‖, 
allowing for further increases in public debt without 
undermining sustainability.  
The mechanism through which GDP-linked bonds (and 
similarly, sukuk) help to increase fiscal space arises because 
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the evolution of sovereign debt ratios is affected by stochastic 
variation in GDP. During lower-than-expected growth, the 
creditworthiness of sovereigns fall because the poor ratings due 
to higher-than-expected debt ratio raises default risk. If the debt 
contract could be varied to modulate the debt service during 
bad times (e.g. economic shocks such as the COVID-19 
pandemic), default risk would decline. Such flexibility in 
exchange for an increased rate of return during good times, 
would allow the debt contract to be written with a lower 
average interest rate. 
Kim and Ostry [18] ran simulations that suggest fiscal 
space gains in the order of 10-60% of GDP for a representative 
advanced economy, assuming investor risk neutrality. 
Simulated gains in fiscal space are larger for counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy because, holding constant the extent of growth 
uncertainty, more countercyclicality in policy amplifies 
stochastic variation in the debt ratios by more for nominal bond 
than for GDP-linked bond. 
In their research, Bank of England researchers [3] focused 
on the ―amount GDP-linked bond that can potentially increase 
debt limits, rather than the absolute value of the debt limits 
themselves‖. Even with the simplest model set-up used, they 
found that ―GDP-linked bonds have a substantial impact on a 
sovereign‘s debt limit – raising it by around 100% of GDP‖.  
Pienkowski [23] found that ―even issuing relatively modest 
amounts – say 20% GDP-linked bond of the total debt stock — 
can have a significant impact on the debt limit‖. From Figure 2, 
it is observed that for advanced economies (AEs), ―the debt 
limit would rise by around 15% points of GDP, which would 
be enough to accommodate the median fiscal costs of a 
systemic banking crisis
2
‖. Emerging markets (EMs) have a 
maximum debt limit when GDP-linked bonds make up around 
80% of the debt stock. Beyond this, the cost of issuing these 
instruments outweighs the benefits, and the debt limit begins to 
fall. ―For AEs, the debt level continues to increase with the 
share of GDP-linked bond‖ [24]. For low-income countries 
(LICs), however, there is no change in the debt limit (relative 









                                                          
2   Amaglobeli et al. [1] estimate that the ―direct fiscal cost of a systemic 
banking crisis recapitalisation and asset purchases) has a median of 6% of 
GDP; while the median increase in public debt associated with these events is 
around 14% of GDP‖. ―An 8%-point increase in the debt limit for EMs is also 
substantial, enough to accommodate additional borrowing through a typical 
recession‖ [16]. 
Figure 2: Change in Debt Limits with Variation of GDP-linked Bond to the 




The results of the various GDP-linked bond composition 
research suggest that ―there is no one-size-fits-all debt structure 
that all countries should target‖. For LICs, with the lowest 
‗baseline‘ debt limit, results seem to suggest that ―focus may be 
best directed at reducing exchange rate risk through local 
currency debt issuance and building institutions that can raise 
the maximum sustainable primary balance‖ [23]. For EMs, 
when they have adequately diminished exchange rate risk, the 
benefits from GDP-linked sukuk become obvious. But 
Pienkowski‘s results show that AEs benefitted the most, ―with 
debt limits rising by 15% points when GDP-linked sukuk make 
up one-fifth of the debt stock‖. 
From a cost-benefit approach, government issuers may 
consider starting at lower levels of the debt stock, since the 
‗marginal benefit‘ (in terms of the change in the debt limit) 
reduces across the board for all countries. It should be noted 
that the ―results presented are sensitive to the parameter 
assumptions, perhaps the largest uncertainty involves the risk 
premium required by investors to hold local currency and 
GDP-linked bond‖ [23]. Also, a useful consideration is to 
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incorporate a long maturity debt into the tenure of the model, 
or even to contemplate perpetuity. Other valuable 
considerations would include capturing the various policy 
frameworks in different countries such as currency union. Such 
countries have considerably less latitude to control nominal 
GDP through monetary and fiscal policy, and hence the 
perceived benefits of GDP-linked sukuk based on the study 
may be impaired. 
III. COPING WITH THE ECONOMIC REPERCUSSION OF THE 
PANDEMIC AND INCREASING LEVELS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT 
As mention in the earlier section of this research, we 
propose that governments do two things, on top of what have 
already been implemented so far in terms of austerity measures 
to save lives. In the subsequent phase of this pandemic, the 
next order of business is to save the economy. In order to 
prevent further undesired outcomes, (1) Identify the ‗most 
vulnerable group‘ within their communities and assess their 
household and personal debt levels for consideration of debt 
forgiveness. (2) Allow micro, small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) to restructure their corporate debts or renegotiate for 
new terms as a form of debt relief. These two initiatives will be 
funded through a GDP-linked sukuk issued by the country. The 
financial burdens lifted by these initiatives will have positive 
effects on the economy as capital which would have been used 
to pay down the debts will instead be utilized as spending or 
consumption for the vulnerable groups and necessary 
expenditure for the SMEs. This cycle of spending will in turn 
contribute towards GDP growth and, directly and indirectly, 
save jobs and limit unemployment, on the road to economic 
recovery. 
A. Debt Forgiveness 
Consumer debt is a concern today because it has reached 
record levels [2] and because its rise comes as powerful trends
3
 
shape how debt is incurred and the consequences it has for 
financial security. We see the issue of consumer debt as a 
necessary challenge, different in many ways than the more 
widely understood mortgage debt (borrowing to buy a home) 
that precipitated the Great Recession of 2018. Our definition 
includes all forms of non-mortgage debt such as student and 
auto loans, credit cards, and non-loan obligations including 
medical debt and money owned to local governments that have 
come to use such fines and fees as a key revenue source. The 
scope of this mounting crisis is troubling: for example, debt in 
collections now appears on one-third of consumer credit 
reports.  
The approach to these can be worked out through a 
framework that is built on the analyses of historical patterns, 
contemporary drivers, and differences among demographic 
groups. The vulnerable group can be defined via its debt-to-
income (DTI) indicator — the higher the number, the more 
vulnerable the group is. Based on this information, the 
classification of the outstanding debts and its volume, the debt 
                                                          
3   Trends such as stagnating incomes, new forms of credit availability, and 
structural changes in medical and education markets. 
forgiveness can be applied to the group below a certain DTI 
value. Targeted forgiveness of household debt held by 
borrowers whose loans are most likely to undermine their 
financial security (i.e. the low-income debtors determined 
through the DTI value). 
For illustration purposes, we have taken the debt-to-income 
ratio (DTI) and debt service ratio (DSI) for European countries 
for the year 2017
4
 only. From Figure 3, we can see that the 
bottom 20% of Greece (GR), Cyprus (CY), Netherlands (NL) 
and Slovenia (SI) are 3 times in debt against their income. 
Overall, indebtedness is highest across all sections of income 
levels for Cyprus and Netherlands, with most of them owing 
about 200% (and exceeding) of their income. But before we 
determine the most vulnerable group and apply a cut-off, we 
need to understand the debt-to-service ratio of these groups. 









BE DE EE IE GR ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI
Bottom 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-90% 90-100%
 
Note: The debt to income (DTI) ratio is the ratio of total debt5 to gross 
household income6.  
* For full country abbreviation list, refer to Appendix A. 
Source: Household Finance and Consumption Survey (Year 2017).  
From Figure 4, we can observe that although Netherlands 
is one of the two countries that is considered to have high debt 
to income overall, its debt-to-service ratio is typical of other 
European countries, except for its bottom 20% which far 
exceeds all others. From here, we can determine the most 
                                                          
4   For a better cross-sectional study, the investigation can be extended to 5 
years or more. Debt tenure typically exceed 5 years, so the debt outstanding 
does not change very much in shorter time spans. 
5 Total debt includes mortgages collateralised on household's main residence, 
mortgages collateralised on other real estate property owned by the household, 
non-mortgage loans (consumer credit loans, private loans and other loans not 
collateralised on household's real estate property), credit lines/bank overdrafts 
debt and credit card debt (outstanding amount on which interest is paid at the 
end of the billing period) - unless otherwise specified for a given country (see 
country notes below for more detail). 
6 Total gross household income is calculated as the sum of the employee 
income, self-employment income, income from public pensions, income from 
private and occupational pensions and income from unemployment benefits 
(items collected for households members aged 16+) and income from social 
transfers other than unemployment benefits, regular private transfers (such as 
alimonies), rental income from real estate property, income from financial 
investments, income from private business or partnership and regular income 
from other sources (items collected at the household level). 
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vulnerable group by setting the cut-off as 25% or 30% of DSI, 
i.e. about a quarter of their monthly incomes goes to 
repayment of debts. 
The next approach for this Debt Forgiveness for Most 
Vulnerable Households policy is to assess if (1) dissolution of 
household debt capped at a certain value per borrower (e.g. 
$50,000–$100,000), or (2) full termination of all household 
debt for the extremely vulnerable group, where we can set as 
those with 25% or 30% of DSI.  











BE DE EE IE GR ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI
Bottom 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-90% 90-100%
 
Note: The debt service to income ratio is calculated as the ratio between total 
monthly debt payments and household gross monthly income7, among 
households with debt payments.  
Source: Household Finance and Consumption Survey (Year 2017).  
 
B. Debt Relief or Debt Restructuring 
Governments and nations have good reason to fear economic 
distress in SMEs, because economic and health crises can 
produce massive unemployment and stunt economic recovery. 
SMEs are the backbone of most economies in the world — in 
Asia alone, they account for more than 70% of all businesses 
and between 32 and 87% of total share of employment outside 
the agricultural or farm-based workforce in Asia
8
 [15]. An 
analysis of individual countries in Europe reveals that the 
―support SMEs receive from financial institutions to help 
finance their businesses does not reflect their contributions to 
their country's GDP and employment, despite being the critical 
drivers for growth‖ [9]. In general, SME loan volumes in the 
EURO region are less than 40% of their contribution to GDP, 
                                                          
7 Total gross household income is calculated as the sum of the employee 
income, self-employment income, income from public pensions, income from 
private and occupational pensions and income from unemployment benefits 
(items collected for households members aged 16+) and income from social 
transfers other than unemployment benefits, regular private transfers (such as 
alimonies), rental income from real estate property, income from financial 
investments, income from private business or partnership and regular income 
from other sources (items collected at the household level). 
8   Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2018: Advancing decent 
work for sustainable development by International Labour Organization, 
2018. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-
bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_649885.pdf 
and constitute less than 20% of total loans, according to IMF 
data. 
Figure 5: Small loans (< €250k) with respect to total NFC lending (NBV*), by 
percentage and country 
 
 
Source: EIF (2019) based on ECB Data Warehouse 
Huerga et al. [14] show that ―small loans are a good proxy for 
the SME lending market‖. In the EIF report [9], it was 
observed that ―small loans are relatively more important in the 
credit market of vulnerable countries‖. From Figure 3, in Spain 
and Portugal, for example, ―small loans make up 40% and 
35%, respectively, of new loans granted to non-financial 
corporations (NFCs). For September 2019, both shares stayed 
roughly constant compared to the same month in 2018. Also, in 
Italy this share is relatively high at 25%. In Austria, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Belgium and Germany, the proportion 
of small loans in total new business volume is much smaller 
and does not exceed 10%‖. 
The next approach for this SME Debt Restructuring policy is to 
calculate the cost of delaying the monthly payments for their 
SME loans. This can be easily calculated through the banks‘ 
data. Options are (1) to retain the same monthly payments by 
offering moratoriums, or (2) renegotiate monthly payment 
premiums based on longer tenures or reduced monthly 
borrowing rates. 
IV. BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGES OF GDP-LINKED SUKUK 
The idea of issuing GDP-linked sukuk is similar to having 
some kind of insurance against unprecedented economic 
shocks in very uncertain times. Past debt crises that involved 
countries like Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain over a 
decade ago would have been less severe if their debt had been 
coupled to their GDP. Investment in GDP-linked instruments 
allow for risks to be more acceptable, given the unlimited 
upside to investing in entire economies. In addition, global 
investors can achieve the benefits of diversification by holding 
GDP-linked sukuk of nations tied to their growth and survival. 
Embracing GDP-linked sukuk puts pressure on delivering 
performance for sovereign debt managers but rising public debt 
burdens should incentivise many of them to consider new 
forms of borrowing that appeal to a wide range of investors. 
This includes ones with limited exposure to conventional 
sovereign sukuk. Outreach by the GDP-linked sukuk working 
group suggests there is potential demand for the new 
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instruments from pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, 
insurance companies, equity funds and hedge funds [4; 17]. 
There are important advantages to issuing GDP-linked 
sukuk for both the issuing countries and the investors, as 
discussed in this research (see also [11]). The system-wide 
benefits afforded by growth-linked instruments far exceed 
those that can be achieved by individual investors or countries. 
GDP-indexed securities can be viewed as desirable vehicles for 
international risk sharing and for avoiding the disruptions 
arising from formal default. The dead-weight costs of long debt 
restructuring at times of crises would be avoided, as debt was 
automatically modified. GDP-linked sukuk have characteristics 
of a public good as they generate systemic benefits above those 
accruing to individual investors and countries. If GDP-linked 
sukuk lowered risk of default, they would make remaining 
conventional sukuk safer, in the same country [11]. By 
reducing likelihood of defaults, they would also benefit a 
broader range of investors than just those directly affected, 
along with economies not issuing them, but which would 
reduce their chance of contagion from other countries, as well 
as economies and multilateral institutions. 
The reality is that, despite its demonstrated benefits, GDP-
indexed debt has not been widely issued, beyond countries 
having difficulties in servicing their debts. The inertia caused 
by financial innovation coupled with the complexity of 
implementing new financial inventions may be the 
impediments. But like most things worth accomplishing, it 
takes time and effort to pursue an innovation until its 
successful implementation. Perhaps, the current economic dire 
straits caused by the pandemic may provide the impetus and 
motivation to do so. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the increasing levels of sovereign debt levels and 
diminishing reserves, ―GDP-linked debt is an attractive 
instrument for this purpose because it can ensure that debt stays 
in step with the growth of the economy in the long run and can 
create fiscal space for countercyclical policies during 
recessions‖ [18]. Thus, GDP-linked debt would give 
governments more room to maneuver in its fiscal policy space, 
which would be especially valuable at a time like the present 
when fiscal space is scarce, and immediate solutions are 
urgently needed. 
While such sukuk market development is still not 
widespread, the debt capital markets have come a long way 
since the Brady bonds of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
ability to protect the vulnerable group and SMEs at this crucial 
time where most countries are restarting their stalled 
economies, such instruments also help investors manage 
country risks and further raises its desirability. GDP-linked 
sukuk could also allow risk to be shared across borders more 
efficiently and safely, while potentially reducing the need for 
international bailouts of sovereigns and so reduce morally 
hazardous behaviors and agency risks. 
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